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I. INTRODUCTION
The debate over whether cyberspace' can or should be regulated is
essentially dead.2 This is the conclusion being taught in law schools
today. The battle between Judge Frank Easterbrook4 and Professor
Lawrence Lessig5 over "laws" and "horses," infamous among cyberspace
legal scholars, became irrelevant when geographically-based governments
began regulating Internet related activities. 6 However, debate over how
the Internet should be regulated continues.
One way of framing this debate is in terms of deciding how to regulate
behavior in cyberspace. 7 Professor Lessig postulated four kinds of
constraints regulate behavior: (1) social norms, (2) markets, (3) law, and
(4) architecture.8 This comment first argues that lawmakers must focus
1.

William Gibson coined the term "cyberspace" in his science fiction classic,
originally published in 1984. WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER 51
(1984). See also THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE FICTION 288 (John Clute & Peter
Nicholls eds., 1993) (crediting Gibson with adding "cyberspace" to the English
language); Susan Mallon Ross, Frontiers and Legal Landscapes: As Safety Valves Open
NEUROMANCER,

and Close, in REAL LAW @ VIRTUAL SPACE: COMMUNICATION REGULATION IN
CYBERSPACE 51, 53 (Susan J. Drucker & Gary Gumpert eds., 1999) (discussing Harvard

Law Professor Laurence Tribe's definition of "cyberspace" in the keynote address of The
First Conference on Computers, Freedom, and Privacy in 1991).
2.

ROBERT S. R. KU ET AL., CYBERSPACE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 37 (2002)

(stating "the debate over whether cyberspace could be regulated is largely a historical
milestone"). During the debate over whether cyberspace can or should be regulated,
freedom of expression advocates, like The Electronic Frontier Foundation declared a
"cyberspace declaration of independence." John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the
Independence of Cyberspace (1996), at http://www.eff.org/-barlow/Declaration-Final.
html (last visited Oct. 25, 2003).
3. Professor Jane Henning, Lecture at the University of San Diego School of Law
on Cyberspace (Jan. 21, 2003).
4. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 207 (1996).

5. See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113
HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999). Lawrence Lessig is a professor of law at Stanford Law
School and founder of the Stanford Center for Internet and Society. In October 2002,
Professor Lessig argued in front of the United States Supreme Court in Eldred v.
Ashcroft, a case regarding the constitutionality of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
See Stanford Law School: Lawrence Lessig, A Short Biography, at http://www.lessig.
org/bio/short/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2003).
6. Ku, supra note 2; see also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992);
State of Washington v. Heckel, 143 Wash. 2d 824 (2001); CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber
Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1022 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Dow Jones & Co. v.
Gutnick, 2002 AUST HIGHCT LEXIS 44 (2002).
7. See Lessig, supra note 5.
8. Id. at 507. See generally John de Monchaux & J. Mark Schuster, Five Things
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on using the fourth constraint-architecture 9-if an interconnected
global, democratic society is truly an international goal. Second, this
comment argues that, in focusing on architectural constraint, game
theory is a uniquely appropriate tool for analyzing Internet issues and
developing Internet laws.
II. FRAMING THE DEBATE
Even if effective regulation requires some mixture of the four constraints,
groups will generally advocate for primary reliance on a single constraint.' 0
Several of these groups are detailed below.
A. Social Norms and Freedom of ExpressionAdvocates
Freedom of expression groups, like the Electronic Frontier Foundation
(EFF) and 2600 Enterprises, Inc., 1 focus on the first constraint, social
norms. Social norms regulate behavior by threatening adverse consequences
or punishments. In cyberspace, customs and etiquette (sometimes called
"netiquette") impose these norms. 12 An example of such a custom is
deleting a long list of recipient email addresses in a "forward" before
one passes along a particularly interesting email message. 13 Another
to Do, in PRESERVING THE BUILT HERITAGE: TOOLS FOR IMPLEMENTATION 3, 3 (J. Mark
Schuster et al. eds., 1997) (discussing the "tools approach to government action," but
enumerating five, rather than four, modalities of constraint).
9. Lessig defines "architecture" as "the physical world as we find it, even if 'as
we find it' is simply how it has already been made." See Lessig, supra note 5. For
example, the fact that the Constitutional Court in Germany is in Karlsruhe, while the
capital is in Berlin, limits the influence of one branch of the government over the other.
Or, that a town has a square, easily accessible with a diversity of shops, increases the
integration of residents in that town. Id. at 507.
10. Id. at 508 (stating, "These four modalities regulate together. The 'net
regulation' of any particular policy is the sum of the regulatory effects of the four
modalities together.").
11. Universal City Studios, Inc., sued Eric Corley and his company, 2600
Enterprises, Inc. over the publication of the DVD regional decryption code, DeCSS, on
their website. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
"2600" has special significance as it was the frequency of a signal that some hackers
formerly used to access the telephone system from "operator mode" by transmitting the
2600 hertz tone across a telephone line. Id. at 435 n.2.
12. Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, No Regulation, Government Regulation, or SelfRegulation: Social Enforcement or Social Contractingfor Governance in Cyberspace, 6
CORNELL J.L. & PUB.POL'Y 475, 493 (1997).
13. See http://email.about.com/cs/netiquettetips/tp/core-netiquette.htm (listing the
"Top 10 Most Important Rules of Email Netiquette" by Heinz Tschabitscher) (last
visited Apr. 7, 2003).

example is to exclude other people's email addresses from website email
lists and forwards to protect them from spam. 14 Social norm punishment
in cyberspace ranges from a polite message aimed at increasing awareness
of the misconduct to social ostracism.' 5 To freedom of expression
advocates, social norms constraints are the best and most natural means
of regulating the Internet.
1. Speech as Liberty and as a Means to Liberty
One simple reason for this perspective may be that the people who
constitute these groups truly believe that thoughts should be freely
expressed. United States Supreme Court Justice Brandeis touched upon
this notion in 1927, when he wrote,
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was to
make men free to develop their faculties, and that in its government the
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both
as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness
and courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and
spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would
be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against
the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an
inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a
fundamental principle of the American government.'I

This passage eloquently expresses an intuition held by many that the
ability to express thoughts is a form of liberty as well as a means to
liberty.
In addition to this intuition, philosophies such as individual liberty,
pluralism, diversity, and community also drive many "freedom of expression"
advocates.' 7 As M. Kapor wrote, "[ljife in cyberspace seems to be shaping
up exactly like Thomas Jefferson would have wanted: founded on the
primacy of individual liberty and a commitment to pluralism, diversity,
and community."' 8
These ideals are supported internationally through the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which states in Article 19 that "[e]veryone
14. See http://www.libertyaffiliate.com/netiquette.html (stating, "When you send
an email to several people at one time, use the BCC feature (Blind Carbon Copy) on
your email software. This will stop others from intentionally or accidentally providing
your email address to bulk email spammers.") (last visited Apr. 7, 2003).
15. Gibbons, supra note 12, at 494.
16. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (J. Brandies, concurring).
17. M. Kapor, Where is the Digital Highway Really Heading?, WIRED 53-59
(July/Aug. 1993), reprinted in James E. Katz & Philip Aspden, A Nation of Strangers?,
CYBERETHICS: SOCIAL & MORAL ISSUES IN THE COMPUTER AGE 296 (Robert M. Baird et.
al., 2000).
18. Katz, supra note 17, at 296.
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has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers."1 9 The United Nations' recognition of these rights affirms the

global commitment to the founding ideals of the Internet. Furthermore,
international recognition of these rights specifically in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, rather than any other resolution, suggests
their fundamental nature and the role these principles will have in the
future development of international cyberlaw and international law
generally 2.
2. It Worked in the Past
Another reason why social norms may be the best and most natural
constraint on Internet behavior may be traced back to 1992.21 That year,

a major watershed in Internet governance took place when the National
Science Foundation (NSF), having merged its network, NSFNet 22, with
the Department of Defense's (DOD) network ARPANET 23, decided they
could no longer run the backbone2 4 of the newly created network
19. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 19, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.
GAOR, 3rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948).
20. The United Nations' website states, "One of the great achievements of the
United Nations is the creation of a comprehensive body of human rights law, which, for
the first time in history, provides us with a universal and internationally protected code
of human rights, one to which all nations can subscribe and to which all people can
aspire ....
The foundations of this body of law are the United Nations Charter and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly in 1948."
BASIC FACTS ABOUT THE UN. Sales No. E.00.I.21 (2000), available at http://www.un.
org/rights/morerights.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2003).
21.
See generally Barry M. Leiner et al., A Brief History of the Internet, at
http://www.isoc.org/internetihistory/brief.shtml (last visited Oct. 31, 2003).
22. In the early 1990s, organizations connecting to the Internet had to sign a usage
agreement directly with NSFNet to gain access to large parts of the Public Internet,
regardless of the Internet Service Provider from which they purchased Internet access.
WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSFNet (providing
a brief history of ARPANET) (last modified Dec. 8, 2003). NSFNet is related to neither
NFSNet, a distributing computing effort to factor large numbers, nor Network File
System (NFS), a TCP/IP filing sharing protocol. Id.
23.
ARPANET, the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network, was the
world's first operational packet switching network, and the progenitor of the global
Internet.
WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, at http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/
ARPANET (providing a brief history of ARPANET) (last modified Dec. 8, 2003).
24. In packet-switched networks, a backbone consists primarily of switches and
interswitch trunks. WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, at http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Backbone (defining "Backbone" in the context of the telecommunications field)

structure. 25 They distributed management of the network to public and
private companies, effectively moving the system's technical administration
out of the United States government's control entirely.26 The Internet
Society (ISOC), a private organization chartered by members of the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), gained formal oversight over
27 and IETF. 28 ISOC committed
the Internet Architecture Board
29 (IAB)
agenda:
following
the
itself to
assuring discrimination-free Internet access;
" halting censorship of online communication;
" limiting government control over essential elements of networking
architecture;
" encouraging cooperation between interconnected networks;
and
" guarding against misuse of personal information offered on the
Internet.
"

This agenda comes as no surprise when one considers that the NSF
created NSFnet not only to extend and improve on ARPANET by creating a
much higher-speed backbone, but also to provide a means for universities
and research institutions not funded by the DOD to gain access to
Internet resources.30 The notion that information should flow freely on
this network was, and still is, considered essential to achieving many
scientific objectives. The scientific community formally declared as
much at the 1999 World Conference on Science in the Declaration on
Science and the Use of Scientific Knowledge-"the importance for
scientific research and education of full and
31 open access to information
and data belonging to the public domain."
(last modified May 17, 2003). The term "Internet backbone" is now used loosely to
describe the "core" of the current Internet, referring to the inter-provider links and

peering points.

WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA,

at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Internet backbone (defining "Internet backbone") (last modified Nov. 18, 2003).
25. MARCUS FRANDA, GOVERNING THE INTERNET: THE EMERGENCE
INTERNATIONAL REGIME

OF

AN

45-46 (2001).

26. Id. at 46.
27. Id. The Internet Architecture Board was formerly known as the Internet
Activities Board and was chaired by David Clark from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT) for many years. Id at 45. The IAB, consisting of members from the
Department of Defense (DOD) and MIT, replaced the Internet Configuration Control
Board (ICCB) who coordinated the discussion of technical questions among government
and private groups and oversaw the network's architectural evolution. The ICCB
consisted of network experts. Id.
28. Id. at 46.
29. CHRISTOS J.P. MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., HISTORY OF THE INTERNET: A CHRONOLOGY,
1843 TO THE PRESENT 167 (1999).
30. FRANDA, supra note 25, at 45.

31.

This idea that information must freely flow is a fundamental concept in the
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This historical synopsis suggests that, before commercialization of the
Internet, a large majority of Internet users, if not all users, held the same
general vision of scientific advancement through information sharing.
Using social norms to restrain undesirable behavior was practical and
effective. First, there was no need to involve politicians to create laws
32
regarding an area they cared little about and understood even less.
Second, there was little need for market constraints because the product
was information. The social norm called for open transfer of information
from all parties involved in the transactions. Finally, no reason existed
for using architecture to constrain behavior on the network. The
challenge, after all, was not to constrain behavior, but instead to create
an architecture that would expand and increase activity on the Internet.
The establishment of an international Internet regime evidences this
focus on expansion. This regime moved "fairly quickly to the technical
realm, largely because of:
1.
2.
3.

the immediacy of the need to establish protocols and standards
if the Internet was to function with a minimum degree of
effectiveness and order;
the relatively small number of players with sufficient knowledge
and interest to be involved in the determination of Internet
protocols and standards; and
accelerating demand-particularly in the United States, Canada,
Europe, and Japan-for access to what was widely viewed as
a series of dramatic new inventions, particularly after the
Internet was enhanced by the World Wide Web. ' 3

Social norms regarding how to behave on the Internet and how to behave
in "cyberspace," 34 provided all the necessary regulation.
scientific community. See U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,
Declaration on Science and the Use of Scientific Knowledge, World Conference on
Science, Budapest, Hungary, July 1, 1999, at http://www.unesco.org/science/wcs/eng/
declaratione.htm.
32. FRANDA, supra note 25, at 44 (stating "most policymakers exhibited initial
reluctance to put international Internet issues at the top of their political agendas, for a
variety of reasons: (1) the Internet entailed subjects about which they knew little...");
Id. at 45-46 ( "[T]he lAB set up a unique procedure for discussion and resolution of
governance issues by opening its membership to anyone anywhere in the world with
technical knowledge and related interests and with sufficient time to invest in the
[IETF's] elaborate discussions.").
33. Id. at 44.
34. One legal scholar describes "cyberspace" most easily characterized by reference to

3. The Past is not the Present
The expansion and commercialization of the Internet dramatically
changed the general profile of the user-base. No longer did35 everyone
traversing the superhighway hold scientific or altruistic goals.
During the 1980s and 1990s, business leaders became increasingly
convinced of the significance of the Internet.36 They were enthusiastic not
about the ISOC's agenda, but rather about the potential for fundamental
changes in business practices, such as through e-commerce, online
banking, and business-to-business networks.37 This potential was soon
realized. In 1999, e-commerce generated an estimated $16.8 billion in
revenues for the fifteen European Community (EC) nations and $71.4
In the United States alone, the overall
billion for the United States.
online economy reportedly generated $507 billion in revenues and
created 2.3 million jobs.39
The money-making potential of the Internet caused many groups,
including politicians, to advocate using the second constraint-the
market-to regulate behavior in cyberspace.
B. The Market and Corporations
The market constrains individuals and collective behavior on the

the Internet, being the virtual, non-physical, space between computer terminals, across
which most communication now flows. Christopher T. Marsden, Cyberlaw and
InternationalPoliticalEconomy: Towards Regulation of the Global Information Society,
2001 L. REV. M.S.U. - D.C.L. 355, 368 (2001).
35. For example, in 1994, a British hacker accessed the information system of a
Liverpool hospital "because he simply wanted to see 'what kind of chaos could be
caused by penetrating the hospital computer.' Among other things, he changed the
medical prescriptions for the patients: A nine-year-old patient who was 'prescribed' a
highly toxic mixture survived only because a nurse re-checked his prescription." Legal
Aspects of Computer-Related Crime in the Information Society, COM(98)1 58 (1998)
[hereinafter COMCrime Study], available at http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/legal/en/
comcrime/sieber.doc. Professor Dr. Ulrich Sieber of the University of Wurzburg
prepared the COMCrime Study for the European Commission. The study's aim was to
provide the European Commission with up-to-date information on the legal issues of
computer-related crime, especially with respect to substantive criminal law, procedural
criminal law as well as the suggestion of alternative solutions. Id. at 3.
36. FRANDA, supra note 25, at 47. By the early 1990s both European and U.S.
leaders had begun to realize the Internet's enormous potential for commercial, business,
and economic development. Id. at 84.
37. Id. at 47.
38. Id. at 91 (estimation reported by the EC).
39. JAN H. SAMORISKI, ISSUES IN CYBERSPACE: COMMUNICATION, TECHNOLOGY,
LAW AND SOCIETY ON THE INTERNET FRONTIER 110 (Molly Taylor et al. eds., Allyn &
Bacon 2002) (citing Charles E. Ramirez, Internet ProducesBillions, DETROIT NEWS Jan.
30, 2000, at C 10).

[VOL. 5: 431, 2004]

Architectural Constraintsand Game Theory
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.

Internet through methods such as price structures and congestion. 40 New
Zealand is one country taking this approach. 4' According to Elizabeth
Longworth, an advisor to the New Zealand Law Commission on electronic
commerce, 42 "pricing structures such as access charges to certain
information on the Web and to Internet services, as well as factors such
as congestion, influence the choices that cyberspace consumers make
and are all examples of cyberspace market regulation. 4 3
In some ways, the market inherently regulates the Internet just as
social norms do. The Internet, as a medium, allows easy movement and
separation of people online who do not agree on basic ground rules. 44
This easy ability to exit is a form of control, a strategy used on Wall
Street.45 If shareholders are unhappy with a publicly traded company,
they may sell their stocks.46 Similarly, the Internet allows "exit", but the
40. Lessig, supra note 5, at 508-09 (stating, "Price structures often constrain
access, and if they do not, then busy signals do. (America Online (AOL) learned this
lesson when it shifted from an hourly to a flat-rate pricing plan.) Some sites on the web
charge for access, as on-line services like AOL have for some time. Advertisers reward
popular sites; on-line services drop unpopular forums. These behaviors are all a function
of market constraints and market opportunity, and they all reflect the regulatory role of
the market.").
41. Elizabeth Longworth, The Possibilitiesfor a Legal Frameworkfor Cyberspace
-including a New Zealand Perspective, in THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF
CYBERSPACE LAW 9, 23-24 (2000) (stating "[i]t is well recognized, especially in the New
Zealand (deregulated) economy, that markets regulate: they constrain both individual
and collective behavior.").
42. Elizabeth Longworth (LLM) has worked with or made presentations to the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the
International Standards Organization (ISO), the European Union Telecommunications
Data Protection Working Group, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). Id. at xi-xii.
43. Id. at 23-24. These same market constraints are already observable in the
United States as well. For example, people in California pay about fifty dollars a month
to receive broadband access in their homes. See, e.g., Road Runner Residential Service,
at http://www.roadrunner.com/rdrun/hso/pricing.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2003)
(stating, "The price of the Road Runner Online Service varies from market to market.
On average, a monthly subscription is $44.95 per month and includes a cable modem.
This fee is in addition to the regular monthly cable subscription; however most cable
providers offer money-saving packages. The monthly fee includes ALWAYS ON access
to the online service and the Internet."). This allows these people to avoid congestion
and access more information faster than using a regular dial up modem.
44. Longworth, supra note 41, at 34, citing David R. Johnson & David Post, Law
and Borders-the Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996).
45. Longworth, supra note 41, at 28.
46. However, this ability to exit cannot occur in a closely-held company, where no
market exists in which to sell. LEWIS D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS LAW AND
POLICY: MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 421 (4th ed. 1998).

exit process is even easier. If a user does not like a particular site, chat
room, or forum, he or she simply clicks to another page. Unlike selling
stock, exercising "exit power" on the Internet is a zero-cost transaction.
The user is not required to pay broker fees to leave, as a shareholder
would pay on selling a stock. Economists tend to favor this "exit"
strategy because it forces the organization whose site the user exits to
eliminate inefficiency, or else the organization will be replaced by a
more efficient competitor.4 7
1. Redrawing the Teams
Along these lines of market constraint, the United States released a
document entitled A Framework for Electronic Commerce in 1997, in
which President Bill Clinton and Vice-President Al Gore asserted:
Governments can have a profound effect on the growth of electronic commerce.
By their actions, they can facilitate electronic trade or inhibit it. Government
officials should respect the unique nature of the medium and recognize the
widespread competition and increased consumer choice should be the defining
features of the new digital marketplace. They should adopt a market-oriented
approach to electronic commerce that facilitates the emergence of a global,
transparent,48 and predictable legal environment to support business and
commerce.

This framework report triggered widespread international discussion and
controversy. 49 The European Union initiated a series of high-level meetings
designed to formulate a European response to what was viewed as a
rather extreme and potentially
threatening U.S. stance on electronic
50
commerce development.
Additionally, the market approach proposed by the Clinton administration
also alarmed the creators and seasoned users of the Internet. First, the
science fiction authors, who coined the term "cyberspace" and filled
their novels with the cyberspace vision,st often pitted individual hackers
or freelance agents against
52 mega-corporation villains, who had supplanted
national governments. The engineers and programmers who designed
47. Id.at 10-11.
48. Memorandum by Ira Magaziner, Chief Internet Policy Advisor to William J.
Clinton, former President of the United States of America, A Framework for Global
Electronic Commerce (Washington D.C. July 1, 1997), at http://www.ta.doc.gov/
digeconomy/framewrk.htm (also known as the "Magaziner Report") (emphasis added).
49. FRANDA, supra note 25, at 83.
50. Id.
51. See THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE FICTION, supra note 1.
52. Walter A. Effross, High-Tech Heroes, Virtual Villains, and Jacked-In Justice:
Visions of Law and Lawyers in Cyberpunk Science Fiction, 45 BuFF. L. REV. 931, 941
(1997); JAK KOKE, DEAD AIR 11 (1996) (discussing a society "where megacorporations
are more powerful than governments."). See also http://store.yahoo.com/2600hacker/
coradtshir.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2003) (selling a t-shirt titled
"Corporate America
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and created protocols 53 and software for the Internet identified with these
fictional hackers.54 To these engineers, just as those science fiction
writers had predicted, corporations were attempting to take governance
of cyberspace away from those who had created and now lived an almost
alter-ego life within it. 55 Despite the fact that "the market" is usually
associated with free movement, the threat presented by corporations and
their lobbying power made "the market" approach adversarial to freedom of
information proponents.56
Commercialization of the Internet also made activists out of hackers,
and made hackers allies with traditional activists. 57 Those who previously
preferred to sit at home in front of monitors rather than be politically
active suddenly found themselves, willing or unwilling, "virtually"
standing side-by-side with grassroots activists. Even as they tried to
Tour Shirt" with the description "The front of the shirt is a graphical image of our
continuing ride through the streets of Corporate America, constantly attracting the
attention of enforcement agencies of all sorts. On the back you'll find a concert tour
style listing of the various legal threats and lawsuits we've faced. Get yours soon before
we have to add more threats and make the print smaller!").
53. The term "protocol" as used throughout this comment refers to the computing
definition. See generally, WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, at http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Protocol (defining "Protocol" in the context of the computing as "a convention
or standard that controls or enables the connection, communication, and data transfer
between two computing devices. Protocols may be implemented by hardware, software,
or a combination of the two. At the lowest level, a protocol defines a hardware
connection.") (last modified Dec. 9, 2003).
54. Union College's Science, Technology and Society Program offers a course
called "Technology in Science Fiction," whose course description states: "A critical
reading of various classical science fiction forms to investigate how well science fiction
writers projected and predicted technological advances. To what extent is actual
technological advancement driven by young future engineers and scientists reading and
embracing science fiction literature?", available at http://www.union.edu/PUBLIC/
ECODEPT/kleind/mellon/sts-proposal.htm (last modified May 12, 2000).
55. Effross, supra note 52, at 942 ("The hackers not only exist in the actual and
virtual shadows of giant companies but attempt to adopt that grayness and anonymity as
their own protective coloration. With rare exception, the corporations are portrayed as
dramatically reducing the initiative and creativity of their employees, reducing them to
figurative if not literal prostitutes.").
56. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); see
also THE ISSUE: US CONSTITUTION, at http://anti-dmca.org/ (website protesting Digital
Millennium Copyright Act). The site also campaigns visitors to place on the visitor's
site a banner stating "Corporations, we've had enough. Take back the Net!", see THE
ISSUE: US CONSTITUTION, at http://www.anti-dmca.org/intro.html.
57. See ELECTRONIC CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE, at http://www.thing.net/-rdom/ecd/ecd.html
(describing Protest in Support of Labor and Indigenous Right's in Mexico by the
Electronic Disturbance Theater on May 31st to June 1st, 2002, sponsored by the
Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School).

cash in on the commercialization of the Internet during the dot-com
era,58 their "electronic civil disobedience" arose.59
"Hacktivists" continue to launch politically motivated attacks on email servers or public web pages by overloading those servers and
hacking into web sites to send a political message. 60 In addition, not
only are citizens of certain countries expressing political views regarding
issues in their own nations, 6 1 but people throughout the world are
expressing views with regards to international issues, ranging from the
Zapatista movement in Mexico 62 to NATO actions in Yugoslavia 63 and
the war in Iraq.64 Many journalists even attributed the organization of
international protests against the United States regarding the 2003 war
against Iraq to the Internet. These include a global protest on February
15, 2003 that consisted of between 8 and 11.5 million people, depending
on the reporting source. 65 With this increased political use of the
58. See http://www.fuckedcompany.com (forum site for individuals to discuss
company lay-offs, usually visited by technical employees who show frustration at "big
brother" even as they attempted to get rich quick through dot-corn stock options).
59. See http://www.thehacktivist.com/ (explaining "[t]he Hacktivist is dedicated to
examining the theory and practice of hacktivism and electronic civil disobedience while
contributing to the evolution of hacktivism by promoting constructive debate, effective
direct action, and creative solutions to complex problems in order to facilitate positive
change.").
60. Eric J.Sinrod & William P. Reilly, Cyber-crimes: A PracticalApproach to the
Application of Federal Computer Crime Laws, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 177, 183 (2000).
61. In 1999, the homepages for the White House, the, U.S. Department of the
Interior, White Pride, the United States Senate, Greenpeace, and the Ku Klux Klan were
attacked by political activists protesting the sites' politics. Id. On February 7, 2000, the
official web site of the Austrian Freedom Party was hacked to protest the inclusion of
Jorg Haider and his party into a coalition Austrian government. Id. at 184. See
generally, Christopher Hitchens, Dgjci vu all over again, SALON.COM (Nov. 11, 1996), at
http://archive.salon.com/news/news2961 lll1.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2003) (stating,
"The Freedom Party is led by Jorg Haider. His father was a leading member of the
Austrian Nazi Party. Haider himself had to resign a few years ago as governor of the
province of Carthinia after a speech in which he praised Adolf Hitler's policy of full
employment. At 47, he also has every chance of becoming Chancellor of Austria in the
not-too-distant future.").
62. The "Electronic Disturbance Theater" promotes civil disobedience on-line to
raise awareness for its political agenda regarding the Zapatista movement in Mexico and
other issues. Sinrod, supra note 60, at 184.
63. During the 1999 NATO conflict in Yugoslavia, hackers attacked web sites in
NATO countries, including the United States, using virus-infected e-mail and other
hacking techniques. Id.
64. See 'Hacktivists' wage Iraq war online, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE (AFP), Mar.
31, 2003, available at http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/03/29/1048653892300.html.
65. Vikram Khanna, The anti-war phenomenon, THE BUSINESS TIMES ONLINE
EDITION (Feb. 17, 2003), available at http://business-times.asial .com.sg/sub/views/story/
0,4574,72838,00.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2003) (stating, "A total of 11.5 million
people took part, according to the collective estimates of the organisers. More like eight
million said police and official sources. The protests were staged in about 350 cities,
said The New York Times. No, 603 cities (including 47 in Asia), said the United for

[VOL. 5: 431, 2004]

ArchitecturalConstraintsand Game Theory
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.

Internet, a unique and extremely valuable attribute of the Internet has
come into fruition-it is now a potential means for actual global democracy.
2. A Virtual World Makes Global Democracy a Reality
Before the Internet, expressing one's voice in the international arena
required traveling through several layers of representatives.66 Beyond
representatives, citizens possessed few practical means of voicing
opinions or obtaining information regarding global issues. The significant
effort required to become involved was unrealistic for the average
individual busy with the demands of daily life.67 As Brock Meeks wrote,
"The twilight of the twentieth century is pock-marked by a citizenry
more concerned about their daily health and well-being-about their
day-to-day survival-than about where government leaders are taking

Justice and Peace (UJP), a coalition of non-governmental organisations which describes
itself as 'a new national campaign' to bring together organisations opposed to a US-led
war on Iraq.... [W]hat nobody disagrees with is that Saturday's protests were the
largest in history-bigger, even, than at anytime during the Vietnam war.... No doubt
about it, the power of the Internet has a lot to do with why the protests turned out to be
so big."). See generally, Stephen D. O'Leary, The Antiwar Movement on the Web, USC
ANNENBERG ONLINE JOURNALISM REVIEW (Oct. 23, 2002), available at http://www.
ojr.org/ojr/oleary/ 1034893068.php (last visited Oct. 27, 2003) (stating, "The Web is
proving to be increasingly important for both interested citizens seeking alternative
perspectives, and antiwar activists seeking to mobilize the public."); David Emery, Web
as PoliticalForce: Iraq warprotest sites show power of Internet to mobilize people, S.F.
CHRON., Dec. 5, 2002, available at http://www.sfgate.con/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/gate/
archive/2002/12/05/iraqprotweb.DTL (last visited Nov. 30, 2003) (quoting, "'The Oct.
26 demonstrations were organized entirely online,' says Pam Fielding, a D.C. political
consultant and the author of 'The Net Effect: How Cyberadvocacy Is Changing the
Political Landscape."').
66. According to Udenrigsministeriet, the Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, "The principle of 'one country one vote' embodied in the Charter of the United
Nations for its General Assembly can be considered as fundamental and perfectly sound
from the viewpoint of fair international relations and promotion of the concept of
national sovereignty, but without bearing on 'democracy' as a form of political
organisation in which citizens have equal rights to participate directly or indirectly in the
exercise of power." Political Culture and Institutions for a World Community, at
http://www.um.dk/udenrigspolitik/copenhagenseminars/um-eng-political-culture/obstac
les.global.asp (last visited Nov. 30, 2003).
67. This is a problem not only in the political scene, but also the corporate one,
where stockholders are rationally apathetic. See SOLOMON, supra note 46, at 545-46;
ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 389-94 (1986). It is also a general problem
when public goods are involved because individuals will have an incentive to ride on the
coat-tails of others. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 12-15 (2d ed. 2000).

the country. '6 8 Of course, obtaining political participation is difficult
even at a local or national level, let alone an international level.6 9
Little doubt exists that the Internet facilitates communication between
groups who would otherwise never communicate. Because of this, it is
an invaluable resource for a truly democratic world. The characteristics
of cyberspace include its ability, as a medium, to communicate a diverse
range of views and activities. Users can move between environments,
adopt different personas, and preempt attempts by nations or sovereign
authorities to impose their own views as to which values, rights and
policies should prevail in a global cyberspace community. 71 The Internet
facilitates political ties across traditional socioeconomic boundaries and
power differentials, increasing participation in civic life.72
This idea that the Internet provides a means towards an actual global
democracy is receiving serious attention in academia. A course called
"Problems of Democracy" taught at the University of Kent at Canterbury,
Department of Politics and International Relations, states in its course
description: "Problems of Democracy engages students in an exploration
of the current debates about democracy ....New developments in democratic
theory-as, for example, in visions of an emerging 'cyberdemocracy'will also be examined on the basis of the theoretical insights gained in
this module., 73 The democratizing attribute of the international Internet
is, indeed, one of its unique attributes, separating it from media forms
such as the telephone, which does not permit easy dispersal of information
to mass numbers of people instantaneously for a flat fee.
Further, the Internet is readily distinguishable from media such as
television. The Internet has a decentralized structure while television
media has a centralized one. Before the mass expansion of the Internet,
68.

Brock N. Meeks, Better Democracy Through Technology, 40 COMMUNICATIONS OF

THE ACM 75 (Feb. 1997), reprinted in CYBERETHICS: SOCIAL & MORAL ISSUES IN THE

COMPUTER AGE 288 (Robert M. Baird et al. eds., 2000). Of course, since the September
1 th terrorist attacks, Meeks statement seems like an exaggeration unless one considers
that political direction now looms in the back of Americans' minds as one factor in
survival.
69. "The Czechs, for instance, are too busy making money, drinking absinthe and
stumbling home on their cobblestone streets to read up on issues and candidates ...
Czechs no longer worry that their democratic experiment will end if they don't voteand neither do people in the USA." Laura Vanderkam, Hurrahfor Right to Vote-or Not,
USA TODAY, Nov. 5, 2002, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/ 200211 -05-oped-vanderkamx.htm.
70. Longworth, supra note 41, at 21.
71. Id. This all assumes, of course, either a common language or translation of
information from one language to another.
72. Gibbons, supra note 12, at 479-80.
73. University of Kent at Canterbury, Course Description, P0833: Problems of
Democracy, available at http://www.kent.ac.uk/politics/prospectivepg/ pgmodules/po833.html
(last modified Sept. 23, 2003). This course was offered as early as Fall 2002.
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television media controlled the visual and widespread presentation of
social issues to multiple audiences at once. The "media" defines the terms
of the debate, and which sources are authoritative.74 Before the popularity
of the Internet, if television did not present an issue, most individuals did
not learn of it.7 5 Cyberspace changed this. Unlike television, books,
newspapers, or radio, cyberspace is not yet controlled by a few select
corporations acting as gatekeepers to the mainstream world. The Internet
provides a means to find information, fact or opinion, credible or
ridiculous, on any type of topic at any time of day, with a simple click of
the "Google TM" search button.76 The Internet's global and decentralized
77
information network facilitates and enhances global democracy.
This ability to facilitate and enhance global democracy is essential to
achieving the goal of an integrated global community expressed by many

international organizations. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), which consists of thirty member countries
including the United States, Australia, Japan, and many European

74. Gibbons, supra note 12, at 479.
75.
See Bill White: American Media Uses Disinformation To Guide Policy:
CorporationsHave More Say Than Bush on ForeignAffairs, PRAVADA, Oct. 11, 2001,
available at http://english.pravda.ru/usa/2001/10/11/17799.html (Russian forum site with
article heading "American Media Uses Disinformation to Guide Policy: Corporations
have more say than Bush on foreign affairs."). Print media, radio and town hall meetings
also present issues for the general public. However, factors such as convenience and
low-time consumption make television an arguably more powerful form of mass
persuasion. See generally, Shanto Iyengar, 'Media Effects' Paradigmsfor the Analysis
of Local Television News (1998) (research paper prepared for Center for Communications and
Community, Annie E. Casey Foundation Planning Meeting, Sept. 17-18, 1998) ("Scholars
from every discipline have weighed in at length on the meaning and significance of the
shift from print media to television as the news medium of choice"), available at
http://www.stanford.edu/-siyengar/research/papers/effects.html.
76. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 881 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ( "The plaintiffs in
these actions correctly describe the "democratizing" effects of Internet communication:
individual citizens of limited means can speak to a worldwide audience on issues of
concern to them. Federalists and Anti-Federalists may debate the structure of their
government nightly, but these debates occur in newsgroups or chat rooms rather than in
pamphlets. Modem-day Luthems still post their theses, but to electronic bulletin boards
rather than the door of the Wittenberg Schlosskirche. More mundane (but from a
constitutional perspective, equally important) dialogue occurs between aspiring artists, or
French cooks, or dog lovers, or fly fishermen.").
77. "The global. information infrastructure... is often claimed to be a democratic
technology. It is said to create electronic democracy, to facilitate or enhance democratic
process." Deborah G. Johnson, Is the Global Information Infrastructure a Democratic
Technology, COMPUTERS AND SOCIETY 27 (Sept. 1997), reprinted in CYBERETHICS: SOCIAL &
MORAL ISSUES INTHE COMPUTER AGE 304 (Robert M. Baird et al. eds., 2000).

nations, 78 commits itself to democratic governments and the market
economy. 79 The OECD produces internationally agreed instruments, decisions
and recommendations to promote rules of the game in areas where
multilateral agreement is necessary for individual countries to make
progress in a globalized economy. 8° Additionally, the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is mandated
under its Constitution to advance "the mutual knowledge and understanding
of peoples, through all means of mass communication and to that end
recommend such international agreements as may be necessary... [and
to] give fresh impulse to popular education and to the spread of
culture."'
An integrated global community should be a larger goal of the United
States in furthering its national interests. President Clinton, one year
after the September l1th terrorist attacks, explained his view on the
larger reasons behind the unstable world situation:
The interdependent world we live in is not yet an integrated community, that is,
with shared values, shared benefits, shared institutions. So America's number
one job now, is to change this interdependent world into an integrated
community .... We can't put all the walls up again. So our real job
82 is to bring
the world closer together around shared values and shared interests.

As many commentators assert, the Internet forwards this job of bringing
the world closer together through its unique ability to cross borders and
join people of shared values.8 3
Of course, this same ability to obtain information so readily and
expansively on the Internet is also a threat. Neither social norms nor
market constraints seem capable of controlling behavior criminal under
traditional laws, including trafficking in child pornography,8 4 attacks on
life,8 5 and organized crime.86 Because of this, individuals such as law
78. OECD Member Countries, available at http://www.oecd.org/documentprint/
0,2744,en_2649_201185_1889402 1 1 1_l,00.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
79. About: OECD, at http://www.oecd.org/about/0,2337,en-2649_201185_1_1
I 1 1,00.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2003).
80. Id.
81. Teresa Fuentes-Camacho, Introduction: UNESCO and the Law of Cyberspace,
I THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OFCYBERSPACE LAW 1 (2000).
82. President Bill Clinton, Late Show with David Letterman (CBS television
broadcast, Sept. 1, 2002), available at http://home.hiwaay.net/-ellisc/LateShow/Late
Show2002-09-11-32k.mp3.
83.

See CYBERETHICS: SOCIAL & MORAL ISSUES IN THE COMPUTER AGE 283-352

(Robert M. Baird et al. eds., 2000).
84. "In 1996, the Spanish public was stunned by a case of distribution of child
pornography when two students with a collection of over 150 floppy disks with child
pornography all collected over the Internet had to be released after 3 days in prison
because of a legal gap in the new Spanish Criminal Code of 1996." COMCrime Study,
supra note 35, at 56.
85. See COMCrime Study, supra note 35.
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professors advocate using law, the third constraint, to control such
behaviors on the Internet.

8

C. The Law Constraintand Law Professors
The law constraint penalizes or sanctions behavior that violates a
directive under that law. 88 Numerous law review articles argue for the
application of real world laws to the Internet realm, contending that

analogies between behavior in the physical world and cyberspace are
adequate. 89 To these scholars, cyberspace is simply another new technology
that must be integrated into the current legal framework like the steam
engine. 90 Recently, these scholars began announcing that an international
regime was emerging. 9 1
1. Stages in the Formation of an InternationalRegime
Generally, international regimes form through92three stages: (1) agenda
setting, (2) negotiation, and (3) operationalization. The first stage, agenda
setting, includes the debate over whether cyberspace could be regulated.
It also includes studies by different international bodies defining cyberspace,
categorizing cyberspace behavior, and surveying issues specific to the
Internet.93 During this first stage, the European Commission sanctioned

a report received in 1998 which divided computer crimes into four main
categories: (1) infringement of privacy, (2) economic offenses, (3)
86. In 1994, a Russian group attacked one of the best known U.S. banks in New
York via data networks, transferring over $10 million to foreign accounts from their
operating base in St. Petersburg. COMCrime Study, supra note 35, at 58.
87. See Lee Gomes, Hot Field of Cyberlaw Is So Much Hokum, Some Skeptics
Argue, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2002, at B 1.
88. Longworth, supra note 41, at 23.
89. See generally Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy,65 U. CHI. L. REV.
1199 (1998); but cf David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law
in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996) (criticizing this view).
90. Joseph H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1145, 1147
(2000) ("The steam engine and the Industrial Revolution probably transformed American
law, but the "law of the steam engine" never existed).
91. See FRANDA, supra note 25, at 44; MARC D. GOODMAN, The Emerging
Consensus on Criminal Conduct in Cyberspace, 2002 UCLA J. L. TEC. 3, 5 (2002).
92. FRANDA, supra note 25, at 2. (Franda credits Oran Young as identifying these
steps.) ORAN R. YOUNG, CREATING REGIMES: ARTIC ACCORDS AND INTERNATIONAL

GOVERNANCE 1-28 (1998)); see also Eva T. Bloom, Book Review, 95 A.J.L. 481
(2001) (reviewing ORAN R. YOUNG, CREATING REGIMES: ARTIC ACCORDS AND
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE (1998)).

93.

See COMCrime Study, supra note 31.

illegal and harmful contents, and (4) other offenses, including attacks on
life, organized crime, and electronic warfare.94
The second stage in the formation of an international regime, negotiation,
includes the 1997 Clinton administration proposal, which set forth the
previously noted Framework for Global Electronic Commerce.95 This
stage also includes negotiations between major international organizations,
including the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), 96 the Group of Eight (G8), 97 the Council of Europe,98 the
European Union, 99 and Interpol. 100
The final stage of international regime formation, operationalization,
has largely taken place in advanced information technology (IT)
societies, such as the United States.' 0 ' Formidable challenges continue
to exist in emerging and less developed countries, however, including
the People's Republic of China, perhaps the most advanced computer
society among less developed countries.'02
2. The Great Firewallof China
China is one of several nations attempting to firewall the entire nation
from the rest of the world's Internet infrastructure by using a separate,
government authorized protocol, X.25, rather than the decentralized and

94. Id. at 39-61.
95. See Magaziner, supra note 48.
96. See supra at 445.
97. The G-8 (Group of Eight) began to call for international cooperation to prevent
cybercrime in 2000. See Yomiuri Shimbun, G-8 to Address Cybercrimefor 1st Time, at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/aw/g8cyber.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2003). The
G-8 consists of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Italy, Germany,
Japan, and Russia. Luke Johnson, G-8 Nations Highlight Need for Universal Internet
Access (Aug. 7, 2000), availableat http://usembassy.state.gov/tokyo/wwwhg084.html.
98. The Council of Europe consists of forty-five member countries and considers
policy in every area except defense. See generally http://www.coe.int/T/e/Con/about_coe.
See also http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/al/04.htm (stating that the Council of Europe does
not cover defense issues).
99. The European Union (EU) was established after World War II. Today, the EU
has fifteen member nations and is preparing for the accession of thirteen eastern and
southern European countries. See The Europorean Union at a Glance, at http://www.
europa.eu.intlabc/index-en.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
100. "Interpol," once the telegraphic address, was officially incorporated into the
Organization's new name adopted in 1956: International Criminal Police OrganizationInterpol (abbreviated to ICPO-Interpol). Interpol was set up in 1923 to the purpose of
globally enhancing and facilitating cross-border criminal police co-operation. Today, it
is the biggest international police organization with 181 member countries spread over
five continents. Interpol--an overview, at http://www.interpol.int/Public/lcpo/FactSheets/
FS200101.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2003).
101. FRANDA, supra note 25, at 2.
102. Id.
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de facto world standard, TCP/IP.10 3 The media has sometimes termed
this "the Great Firewall of China."' 4 Computer networking within China's
national borders is similar
to secure and restricted intranets of large
10 5
private corporations.
China sits at one end of the spectrum for less developed countries. At
the other end are the poorer least developed countries, whose main
operability challenge arises with simply providing meaningful connectivity
between their citizens and the digital world.10 6 This has been termed the
"digital divide," defined as the gap between those able to benefit by
digital technologies and those who are not. 10 7 The G8 mandated the
elimination of the digital divide in the July 2000 Okinawa Charter on the
Global Information Society, and created a task force called the Digital
Opportunity Task Force (DOT Force) to oversee this mission.10 8
D. PreservationthroughArchitecture
Even as an international regime for governing the Internet emerges,
lawmakers must remain vigilant in protecting the unique opportunities
the Internet provides the global community in its evolution towards a
truly global society. As Professor Raymond Ku argues, "Cyberspace,
like the Western frontier, reopens 'the debate over values that always
precede the formation of principles and always infuses the effort to
implement and interpret law and legal principles."" 9 The opportunities
103.
104.

See infra at 453.
See Hamish McDonald, Struggle of Ideas Heads into Space, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Oct. 5, 2002, at 15 (stating "Try typing 'Falun Gong' into your Internet search
engine in China and you will not get far. What is now known as the 'Great Firewall of
China' comes into action and you get a notice saying: 'This page cannot be displayed"');
Bruce Einhom, The Great Firewall of China, BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 23, 2002, at 58
(stating "For now, at least, the Great Firewall appears to be successfully guarding the
Middle Kingdom.").
105.

FRANDA, supra note 25, at 2-3.

106. Id. at 3.
107. Welcome to DigitalDivide.org,at http://www.digitaldivide.org/over.html (last
visited Oct. 17, 2003). See generally the Public Broadcasting System's series on the
digital divide, available at http://www.pbs.org/digitaldivide/ (discussing the role
computers play in widening social gaps).
108. About the DOT Force, at http://www.dotforce.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 17,
2003). See also Canada Helps Build New Partnershipswith Africa (June 27, 2002), at
http://www.pm.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=E&Page=newsroom&Sub=newsreleases&D
oc=africa.20020627.e.htm (announcing "Canada Helps Build New Partnerships with
Africa: $35 million for three initiatives to help bridge the digital divide.").
109. Ira Glasser, The Struggle for a New Free Speech Paradigm: Protecting Free
Speech and Privacy in the Virtual World of Cyberspace, 23 NOVA L. REV. 627 (1999), as
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the Internet provides go beyond this debate over interpretation of legal
principles and reaches to all of the democratizing and globalizing features
of the Internet. To achieve these international goals of democratization and
globalization, the fourth constraint-architecture-sits in a unique
position to effectively regulate the Internet.
The common real world example of how architecture constrains
behavior is the highway." 0 A highway dividing two neighborhoods
limits the extent to which the neighborhoods integrate."' Analogously,
the infrastructure of the Internet may be used to constrain behavior in
cyberspace. This infrastructure includes transfer protocols and physical
routes from the home computer to the Internet backbones." 2
1. Architecture as the Primary Constraint
Architecture should be the primary constraining method on the Internet
for three main reasons. First, developers are less likely to resist this type
of regulation because it allows them to remain directly involved in the
evolution of the Internet, their brain child." 3 Consider the Free Network
Project, which created Freenet, a large-scale peer-to-peer network
designed by professors, professionals, and other leaders in the network
communications field.' 14 Using the inherent properties of cyberspace, this
program is designed to completely decentralize peer-to-peer file sharing. 15
All communications are encrypted and anonymous. r Basically, the
program evades the legal problems of Napster." 7 Developers specifically
cited in Raymond Ku, Forward:A Brave New Cyberworld?, 22 T. JEFFERSON L. REV.
125, 129 (2000).
110. Lessig, supra note 5, at 507.
111.

Id.

112. Id. at 509 (stating "[t]he code, or the software and hardware that make
cyberspace the way it is, constitutes a set of constraints on how one can behave.").
113. Scholars commonly use the metaphor of a "brain child" in discussing
intellectual property protection. See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, Patent System Reform: Patent
Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 899, 912 (2002) ("...a greedy corporation has
kidnapped his brain child and its inheritance").
114. See Ian Clarke et al., Freenet: A DistributedAnonymous Information Storage
and Retrieval System, In Proc. of the International Computer Science Institute Workshop
on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability, Berkeley, CA, 2000, available at
http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/clarke00freenet.html. See generally, The Free Network Project, at
http://freenetproject.org (last visited Oct. 19, 2003).
115. Id. See also, Ian Clarke et al., Protecting Free Expression Online with Freenet,
IEEE INTERNET COMPUTING 40 (Jan. & Feb. 2002), available at http://www.freenet
project.org/papers/freenet-ieee.pdf ("Freenet employs a completely decentralized
architecture").
116. Id. at http://freenetproject.org/index.php?page=faq (stating "Freenet is free
software designed to ensure true freedom of communication over the Internet. It allows
anybody to publish and read information with complete anonymity.").
117. Professor Lawrence B. Solum, Lecture at the University of San Diego School
of Law on Introduction to Intellectual Property (Oct. 31, 2002) (powerpoints for lecture
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designed this program to resist attempts by "outsiders" to regulate "their
network."' 18 The architecture constraint takes advantage of this mentality,
reinforcing its effectiveness. Involving engineers discourages certain hacking
behaviors. " 9 In other words, social norms act as a secondary constraint.
Secondly, the architecture constraint, when modeled using game theory,
takes into account market forces and constraints such as "exit." 1' Market
constraints are arguably inherent in the Internet and must be taken into
account. 121 Some consider the emerging Global Information Society to be
a child of international economic law. 122 Although "legal constraints"
may take into account market forces, the architecture constraint modeled
using game theory couples more naturally with market theory. Both game
theory and market theory fall within traditionally mathematical economic
fields. Additionally, game theory traditionally models market behaviors,
such as pricing controls.
Finally, focusing on the architecture constraint minimizes the amount of
new Internet specific laws requiring global adoption. The United States
may pass laws related to cyberspace, but encouraging adoption of
internationally binding obligations is obviously more difficult. Reliance
on a behavioral constraint which minimizes the need for such an arduous
process is preferable.
Code 123 in cyberspace more easily substitutes for law or norms, subtly
controlling and disciplining socially undesirable behavior. 124 Different
architectures' express different values (e.g., code that permits filtering
Software that encourages chat rooms,
promotes parental control).
irrespective of identity or profiles, reflects values of openness and freedom
of speech. 125 If regulation through code dominates cyberspace's legal
framework, then the issue becomes whether the code projects the "right"

available on file with Professor Solum).
118. The term "their" refers to the creators of the Internet, including original and
current software and network architects, programmers, and developers. See, e.g., The
Freenet Network Project, supra note 116 (stating "Nobody controls Freenet, not even its
creators, meaning that the system is not vulnerable to manipulation or shutdown.").
119.

See supra at 433.

120.
121.
122.

See supra at 439.
See discussion, supra at 439.
Perry Keller, China's Impact on the Global Information Society, in

REGULATING THE GLOBAL INFORMATION SOCIETY 265, 266 (Christopher T. Marsden ed.,

2000).
123. "Code" refers to software code throughout this Comment.
124. Longworth, supra note 41, at 25.
125. Id.

values. According to Lessig:
Law ... is vulnerable to the competing sovereignty of code. Code writers can
write code that displaces the values that law has embraced. ... As the Net
grows, as its regulatory power increases, as its power as a source of values
becomes established, the values of real-space sovereigns will at first lose out. In
many cases, no doubt, that is a very good thing. But there is no reason to
believe that it will be a good thing generally or indefinitely. . . . Indeed, to the
extent that code writers respond to the wishes of126commerce, a power to control
may well be the tilt that this code begins to take.

This competing sovereignty is indeed the cyberspace that many people
perceive, an alternative sovereign authority that needs its own law, its
own cyberlaw.
Naturally, this seems to threaten the current sovereignty of all States in
existence. However, it nevertheless is consistent with the international
model of governance-that is, governance by customary law. An example
of this model of customary law is reflected in the merchant law of the
Middle Ages. 127 The growth of trade required resolution other than by
reference to local law. Merchants needed a common recognition of certain
rules independent of any particular sovereignty.' 28 The twentieth century
saw the rise of "positivism," which drove jurists to seek the source of law 1in
29
a sovereign before that law could be recognized as authoritative.
However, analysis of current international law shows that this customary
law model is still applicable.
International law recognizes a number of sources, including international
custom.

130

Customary international law has two elements: (1) uniform

and constant usage practiced by countries, and (2) a sense of obligation
to follow these rules (opiniojuris).'3' This customary law is decentralized
and not grounded in the actions of any particular sovereign. 3 2 Similarly,
the Internet's inherently decentralized characteristic naturally falls into
this model of governance.
2. Technological Feasibility of Reliance on the Architectural Constraint
Architectural constraint is not impossible given the existing global
Internet infrastructure. China, for example, bases some of its internal
computer networks on X.25 protocols.
126. Lessig, supra note 5, at 543, 548.
127. Longworth, supra note 41, at 29.
128. Id. at 29-30.
129. Id. at 30.
130. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat.
1055, 1060.
131.

ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How

WE USE IT 19 (1994).

132.

Longworth, supra note 41, at 30.
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Leading government monopoly telephone carriers in Europe, Canada,
and Japan (also known as Post, Telegraph and Telephone (PTT) companies)
developed the X.25 protocols. 133 These protocols were based on the
assumption that each country would have a single public data computer
network that interconnects with
adjoining networks at national borders,
134
companies.
telephone
like
just
The public phone network started as one system whose lines and cables
were controlled by government-run companies of sovereign states. One
135
monopolistic entity owned the entire infrastructure from end to end.
This led interoperating local, regional, national, and global networks to
charge each other access fees. 36 The monopolistic37 entity ultimately charges
these access fees back to the originating caller. 1
Following this model, X.25 was designed as a public utility that could
guarantee quality of service over a single network in return for access
charges. In adopting X.25 as its Internet standard, China provides for a
larger government role in network administration and more possibilities
for government Internet control than otherwise possible if either TCP/IP
138
or other proprietary protocols were adopted as the national standard.
However, any move to transition from TCP/IP to X.25 protocols in
nations currently running TCP/IP will meet resistance.
Several reasons lay behind this. First, TCP/IP (Transmission Control
Protocol/Internetwork Protocol) is now used almost universally throughout
the world. It has become the de facto network standard. 139 The cost of
133.

FRANDA, supra note 25, at 26. X.25 is considered multipoint technology, along

the lines of frame relay or ATM. WILLIAM R. CHESWICK & STEVEN M. BELLOVIN,
FIREWALLS AND INTERNET SECURITY: REPELLING THE WILY HACKER 69 (1994).
134. FRANDA, supra note 25, at 26-27.
135. Howard M. Cohen, Economics and the Internet: No Free Rides on the
InfoBahn The Information Superhighway Becomes a Toll Road, in REAL LAW @
VIRTUAL SPACE: COMMUNICATION REGULATION IN CYBERSPACE 95, 96 (Susan J. Drucker

& Gary Gumpert eds., 1999).

136. Id.
137. Id.
138. FRANDA, supra note 25, at 208.
139. FRANDA, supra note 25, at 22, 29. TCP/IP was accepted as a worldwide
standard in the 1990s. Id. at 23. The acceptance of TCP/IP was by no means certain.
Many companies not initially involved with the development of the Internet developed
rival networking protocols to compete with TCP/IP as the potential significance of a
worldwide computer network began to come into focus in the 1970s. Id. at 23-24. These
companies included IBM, Xerox, and Honeywell. Id. at 24. However, because
proprietary protocols were machine and manufacturer specific and subject to intellectual
property protections which required licensing fees, the market naturally chose TCP/IP,

which was free and cross-platform. Id.

switching away from TCP/IP is a formidable obstacle.
Furthermore, the Internet started as a network of networks, designed
and developed to provide common communications between various
platforms. 4 TCP/IP literally privatized and completely decentralized
responsibility for the establishment, control, accountability, maintenance,
and costs of building and maintaining computer networks. 14 1 This privatization
suggests that, between TCP/IP and X.25, the former would be the
cheaper means of expanding the Internet into third world countries,
eliminating the "digital divide" and increasing global democracy.
Finally, unlike X.25, network specialists designed TCP/IP to further
142
the universality and decentralized nature of worldwide computer networking.
The Internet's decentralized infrastructure is harder to control, but makes
the system very robust. A highly organized, systematic, and centralized
global computer network designed like those of the airline route model
may potentially be more efficient and capacious, 143 but lacks this
robustness. A snowstorm or downed city will congest airline traffic in
many, and potentially all, other cities. Network specialists consider such
centralized models threatening. The decentralized design of the Internet
makes it very difficult to attack.44 Rather than centralize and control the
network, these specialists have learned to live with and highly value
what Quentin Hardy has called "the chaotic nature of the beast,
with the
' 45
guiding philosophy being-'hey, nobody owns this thing.""1
This does not mean the world must chose between a centralized and
decentralized system, however. TCP/IP and X.25 protocols are not
mutually exclusive. Systems running TCP/IP and X.25 can be combined
into a single global network. 46 Furthermore, one can still model the
resulting mixed networking system using the analytical tool of game
theory.

140.
141.
142.

Id.
supra note 25, at 27.
Id. at 23. TCP/IP was originally developed under the U.S. Defense Advanced
FRANDA,

Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and was deployed on the old ARPANET in 1983.
CHESWICK, supra note 133, at 19.
143. FRANDA, supra note 25, at 213.
144. See Mathias Strasser, Beyond Napster: How the Law Might Respond to a
Changing Internet Architecture, 28 N. KY. L. REV. 660, 664 (2001) (stating "one of the

foremost concerns was to provide it with as robust an infrastructure as possible so as to
enable it to resist attacks and catastrophic events.").
145. FRANDA, supra note 25, at 213. (quoting Quentin Hardy, Weaving the Perfect
Net, FORBES 141 (July 3, 2000)).
146. FRANDA, supra note 25, at 27. This is not to suggest, however, that X.25 does

not have its own problems. Public X.25 data networks tend to be an "infested soup of
corruption for which the hackers have a separate set of laundering tricks." CHESWICK,
supra note 133, at 142.
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II. GAME THEORY AND CYBERSPACE
Increasingly, scholars are using game theory to analyze and develop
legal theories. The range of fields analyzed is broad, spanning constitutional

law, 147 bankruptcy law, pre-trial behavior, civil procedure, family law,
contract law, corporate law, tort law, and conflicts in law. 148 In addition
to these fields, scholars also use game theory to analyze emerging
international legal issues. These include environmental problems like global
warming, 149 international treaty issues, 150 global economics, 151 and superpower

conflicts. 152 However, despite its increasing use, game theory remains a
mathematical model, 153relying on assumptions that do not necessarily
mirror the real world.

A. Basics of Game Theory
Game theory is a formal mathematical field that studies strategic
behavior.154 Strategic behavior arises when two or more individuals interact
and each individual's decision is influenced by actions of the other
people. 155 Game theory allows its users to describe and to predict strategic
57
behavior,156 logically analyzing situations of conflict and cooperation. 1
147. Meyerson provides an enlightening application of game theory to constitutional
battles, including the infamous case of Marbury v. Madison and the "creation" of the Dormant
See generally MICHAEL I. MEYERSON, POLITICAL
Commerce Clause.
MATHEMATICAL PERSPECTIVES ON OUR CHAOTIC CONSTITUTION 110-24 (2002).

148.
149.

NUMERACY:

DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 5 (1994).
See generally MICHAEL FINUS, GAME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (2001); See also CONTROLLING GLOBAL WARMING:
PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS, GAME THEORY, AND PUBLIC CHOICE (Christoph

B6hringer et al. eds., 2002).
150.
See generally JON Hovi, GAMES, THREATS, AND TREATIES: UNDERSTANDING
COMMITMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1998).
151.
See generally JOHN MCMILLAN, GAME THEORY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

(1986).
152. See generally STEVEN J. BRAMS, SUPERPOWER
THEORY TO SUPERPOWER CONFLICT (1985).
153.
MEYERSON, supra note 147, at 110.

GAMES: APPLYING

GAME

154. MEYERSON, supra note 147, at 109. Modern game theory was developed by
mathematician John von Neumann around 1928, and extended by economist Oskar
Morgenstern in 1944. See JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (Princeton University Press, 1972). Some describe
game theory as the "logical analysis of situations of conflict and cooperation." PHILIP D.
STRAFFIN, GAME THEORY AND STRATEGY 3 (1993).
155. BAIRD, supra note 148, at l. See also MEYERSON supra note 147, at 109.

156.

Randal C. Picker, An Introduction to Game Theory and the Law, in CHICAGO

LECTURES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 29, 30 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000).

All "games" have at least three basic elements: (1) players; (2)
58
Each strategic actor, or "player," can chose
from among several courses of action. 159 The plan or rule used to determine
which course
of action to take at any given instant is the player's
"strategy." 160 A player's returns, or "payoffs," represent the value of the
outcome to the player and are often measured in levels of utility obtained
by each player. 61 Monetary amounts, such as profit in a corporation,
rather than general utility, are sometimes used to define payoffs in the
analysis for the sake of simplicity. 162 Simply stated, a player's payoff is
the amount that using a particular strategy winds up being worth to the
player. 63 Other variables that may be modeled in games include the
level and symmetry of information available to each player, the number
64
of times the game is played, and the number of players in the game.'
Collectively, all of these variables set forth the "rules" of the game.
These rules define the conditions under which the players operate in the
game, that is, who can do what and when they can do it. 165
A typical game relies on several basic assumptions in order to simplify

strategies; and (3) payoffs.

the game. For instance, many games assume that every possible combination
of plays available to the players lead to a well-defined end state (win,
loss, or draw) that terminates the game. One fundamental assumption is
that all players are rational; that is, each player has complete and

157.

STRAFFIN, supra note 154.

158.

WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND
EXTENSIONS 672 (6th ed. 1995); ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN

INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 22 (1989) ("At a minimum, the game's description

must include the players, strategies, and payoffs, for which the actions and information
are building blocks."); see also J.D. WILLIAMS, THE COMPLEAT STRATEGYST 11-17

(1966) (enumerating three elements of players, strategies and payoffs). Varying sources
describe game theory as having usually between three to six elements. See STRAFFIN,
supra note 154 (enumerating four elements: players, strategies, outcomes, and payoffs);
HovI, supra note 150, at 3-4 (enumerating five elements: players, strategies, outcomes,
payoffs, and other rules of the game); RASMUSEN, supra note 158 (enumerating six
general elements: players, actions, information, strategies, payoffs, outcomes, and
equilibria).
159. NICHOLSON, supra note 158; RASMUSEN, supra note 158 ("An action or move
by a player ...is a choice he can make").
160. RASMUSEN, supra note 158 at 24. See also HOvi, supra note *
161. STRAFFIN, supra note 154; RASMUSEN, supra note 158, at 24. In the classic

"Prisoner's Dilemma" game, the utility is no prison sentence versus a heavy prison
sentence. See STRAFFIN, supra note 154, at 73.

162. See RASMUSEN, supra note 158, at 294-300 (applying game theory to patent
races, with monetary payoff).
163.
ALAN C. STOCKMAN, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMICS 418 (1996).
See also
NICHOLSON, supra note 158, at 673.
164. See generally RASMUSEN, supra note 158, at 51, 88; STRAFFIN, supra note 154,

at 128.
165.

STOCKMAN, supranote 163.
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transitive preferences. 166 In other words, given two alternatives, a player
will select the one that yields him the most utility, the greater payoff.
No special abilities or shortcomings cause the player to deviate from the
course of action yielding the most favorable return. 167 In other words,
given his belief about the environment, the rational player maximizes his
objective function.1 68 This assumption is often criticized for reducing
the ability of a game theory model to accurately predict real-world
169
situations, despite the simplicity it lends to the modeling process.
Those who use game theory to analyze and develop legal theories
realize the limitations, yet contend that game theory provides "valuable
insight, even if it does not result in a complete explanation of situations
where peoples' fates are intertwined."' 70 This belief is especially
justified when game theory is applied to an entity like the Internet.
B. Setting up the Internet Game Theory Model
Any useful game theoretic model of cyberspace must ensure that the
actors cannot ignore the reaction of others. This is because rational actors
by definition cannot exist in situations where the reaction of others may be
ignored.7 1 To illustrate, consider an electric company deciding whether to
order a new power plant given its estimate of demand for electricity in ten
years.172 The company faces a complicated decision, but it does not face
another rational agent, so its situation is not appropriate for game theory
modeling.1 73 In cyberspace, passive web site publishers are not appropriate
actors for a game theory model because they have no stake in whether or not
others visit their site. The game theory model of cyberspace proposed here
defines the "players" to be the networked computers and the "rules" to be the
architecture and infrastructure of the entire network, including industry
standards which control communications traveling on that network.
166. See ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS 7 (1992)
(stating "we need to assume not only that all the players are rational, but also that all the
players knows that all the players are rational, and that all the players know that all the
players know that all the players are rationale, and so on, ad infinitum.).
167.
168.

NICHOLSON, supra note 158, at 672.

169.

Id.

170.

Id.

JORGEN EICHBERGER, GAME THEORY FOR ECONOMISTS 1 (1993).

171.

See RASMUSEN, supra note 158, at 9 (stating "the game theory model is not
useful when decisions are made that ignore the reactions of others or treat them as
impersonal market forces.").
172. Id.
173. Id. at 10.

1. Playersplayerl = 192.168.0.1;
Traditionally, game theory model "players" are human, and inherently
irrational. Computers, by their very nature, must respond rationally according
to their architecture and programming, despite the irrational user giving
commands. 174 Therefore, a game theory model that predicts effects of
regulations on computer actors is potentially more accurate than typical
games which try to predict effects on human actors. 175 The limiting assumption
that the "players" must be rational no longer becomes a limitation if the
"players" truly are rational entities. One property of the "player" would
be connection speed. By designating this constraint as a property of the
"player" (the connected computer), this game design incorporates a
market constraint that leads Internet users to buy broadband access. This
model also confines the analyzed activities to interactions between
computers in cyberspace. Every time a human user uses a computer
connected to the Internet, the user logs on and a certain profile is
activated. This description is not unrealistic as it accurately portrays
how employees interact with their company's intranet. 176 In fact, recent
operating systems, such as Windows 2000 and Windows XP, require
home users to create a login into their own home desktops for security
protection.' 77 However, confining the game boundaries to interactions
between computers requires us to acknowledge implicitly the existence
of a separate cyberspace, an idea many engineers embrace and many
legal scholars are reluctant to accept. Some law professors view the
notion of a separate cyberspace jurisdiction as neither necessary nor
helpful, and in fact, even dangerous.1 78 Nevertheless, accepting this
separate existence helps us model behavior in cyberspace.
174.

The very essence of being a computer is possessing rationality. See Rosalind

W. Picard, Does Hal Cry Digital Tears? Emotions and Computers, in HAL'S LEGACY:
2001's COMPUTER AS DREAM AND REALITY 279, 280 (David G. Stork ed., 1997) ("After

all, isn't possessing the highest form of rationality one of the hallmarks of computers?").
175.

See HUGH H. SCHWARTZ,

RATIONALITY GONE AWRY?: DECISION

MAKING

INCONSISTENT WITH ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL THEORY 31-32 (1998) (asserting that

"[s]ome prominent mainstream economists concede that their models have not described
what successful producers, investors and consumers actually do, to nearly the degree
they had expected" and that "[p]erhaps the inclination of many economists and financial
analysts to continue to use models that presume high degrees of rationality reflects what
has been termed a conservative status quo bias, rather than an exercise in rational
behavior on the part of the model builders.").
176. Amy Rogers, You Got Mail But Your Employer Does Too: Electronic
Communication and Privacy in the 21st Century Workplace, 5 J. TECH. L. &POL'Y 1, 19

(2000) (stating "Many employees log onto their computers immediately upon arriving to
work, which usually enters them into a company Intranet system.").
177. The integration of.Net into all aspects of Windows will also facilitate this type
of computer interaction.

See generally, Defining the Basic Elements of .NET, at

http://www.microsoft.com/net/basics/whatis.asp.
178.

Gomes, supra note 87.
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2. Rules = protocols

This game theory model also proposes that protocols, rather than
individuals, define and enforce the rules of the game. In this way, the
architecture constraint operates, rather than the social norm constraint.
Although many engineers may prefer the social norm constraint,

79

they will

more readily support this architecture constraint because it does not facially
challenge their control of cyberspace. It also continues to allow them to
participate in the development of what is essentially their creation. 180 Support
from engineers is vital in the growth of a productive and democratizing
will prevent
Internet because, again, social norms, as a secondary constraint,
' 81
hacking driven by subculture calls to "fight the machine."'
Using protocols to define and enforce the rules is also more cost
effective for the government than using individuals, such as FBI agents,
to roam the Internet, searching endlessly for illegal activity. 8 2 The
networked nature of cyberspace permits this kind of self-policing. To
illustrate, if the ISOC adopts a new standard, the hold-outs may find that
they are unable to communicate with networks outside the hold-out
community. 83 Consider an historical example: As Microsoft's Internet
Explorer (IE) stole the consumer browser market from Netscape, web
developers had to develop code that ran more efficiently on IE than on
Netscape, although they preferred Netscape themselves. 84 Those that
179. See supra at 433.
180. See discussion supra at 450.
181. Id.
182. See Paul Taylor, Issues Raised by the Application of the Pen Register Statutes
to Authorize Government Collection of Information on Packet-Switched Networks, 6 VA.
J.L. & TECH. 4, at para. 8 (2001) ("The program is reported to be named Carnivore because it
rapidly finds the meat, in vast amounts of data. It was developed at FBI computer labs in
Quantico, Virginia, and has been reported to have been used in fewer than 25
investigations over the past 18 months. However, Marcus Thomas, chief of the FBI's
cyber-technology section at Quantico, has indicated that the FBI has already has seen
'growth in the rate of requests', for use of the Carnivore program. The new program
operates on commonly available personal computers and takes advantage of the 'packet'based nature of Internet communications in which computers on the Internet break up email messages, World Wide Web site traffic, and other information into pieces and route
the packets across the global network, where they are reassembled at the other end. FBI
programmers are reported to have devised a 'packet sniffer' system that can analyze data
flowing through computer networks to determine whether it is part of an e-mail message
or some other piece of Web traffic. The Carnivore program is operated under the
exclusive control of government agents.").
183. Gibbons, supra note 12, at 492-93.
184. See Jesse Berst, Why the Browser War is Over, ZDNET ANCHOR DESK (Nov.
10, 1999), availableat http://www5.zdnet.comanchordesk/story/story-4076.html.

developed code for Netscape eventually were unable to ensure their
code functioned in IE, and were left to choose between remaining
with the most basic of web page features (operable on both
browsers), communicating with only those inside their "hold-out"
community, or switching to IE-friendly code despite their own
personal preferences. The networked architecture of the Internet
constrained the developers' behaviors.
This "protocols as rules" approach is more scalable than current
policing solutions such as FBI agent roaming. As the network expands, the
latter approach requires the addition of more individuals proportionately.
Contrast this with the protocol approach, in which the benefits of
following the rules/standards-and the costs of deviating from themincrease as the network grows. Economists sometimes describe this as
network externalities." 5 Users benefit from the fact that others use
the network, so with each new person that follows a protocol, all
current users of the protocol benefit.' 86 For example, the more people
using Napster, the more beneficial Napster became because the
selection of downloadable music increased as the number of people on
the network increased. 87 In a similar way, developers are encouraged
to follow a new standard as use of that standard increases.
This game theory model of cyberspace is superior for two final
reasons. First, data to perform an empirical analysis of the game
theoretic model can be gathered juickly and is, in fact, currently
being gathered by several sources. 188 Second, the number of players
in the game and the potential number of strategies available to the
players make statistical analysis more accurate. Generally, the larger
185. MERGES, supra note 67, at 734; see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in
Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1007 (2001) (stating that the economic theory of
"network effects" instructs us that, the Internet, like the telephone system before it,
increases in economic and social value as more people are connected to it. As many of
the positive benefits of the Internet are linked to this dynamic, in assessing the impact of
regulatory efforts that seek to alter the underlying architecture, "interconnectivity is an
important goal that should not be sacrificed lightly.").
186. MERGES, supra note 67, at 734.
187.

See Alfred C. Yen, A Preliminary Economic Analysis of Napster: Internet

Technology, Copyright Liability, and the Possibility of Coasean Bargaining, 26 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 247, 270 (2001) ( "[A]s each new user joins Napster, the amount and
variety of music available over the Napster network increases.").
188. See generally Terrorism Research Center: Information Research Center, at
http://www.terrorism.com (last visited Oct. 21, 2003) (maintaining a database in
cooperation with Georgetown University on information warfare incidents); Australasian
Institute of Network and Information Warfare, at http://www.infowarzone.com/ (last
visited Oct. 21, 2003) (containing information warfare research in Australia); The
Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School, at http://cyber.law.
harvard.edu/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2003) (a research program to explore cyberspace);
COMCrime Study, supra note 35, at 21-23.
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the sample the more accurately a model will reflect the characteristics
of a population or sub-group of that population.' 8 9
C. Structuringthe Game
With the basics of this proposed game theory model of cyberspace in
place, the next step in developing a useful model requires determining
the form and variables that must be introduced into the game to produce
useful predictions.
1. Form
Generally, there are three ways to structure a game: (1) extensive
form; (2) normal form; and (3) coalitional form.' 90 The extensive form
game describes the game most explicitly. It includes the sequence of
moves, all possible states of information, and the choices at different
stages for all players of the game. 19' The normal form, or strategic form,
omits many of the details in the extensive form, and instead concentrates
on the strategic aspects of the game and the outcomes represented
92 by
their associated payoffs, neglecting the game's dynamic structure.1
Finally, the coalitional form, or characteristic function form, is a
description of social interactions where binding agreements can be made
and enforced. 93 This model allows groups of players to form coalitions,
and is often useful in analyzing distributional problems and situations
in
94
which multiple players may have rationally coinciding strategies.
Due to the massive amount of data available in modeling cyberspace,
a computer program could be developed to determine which of the
above forms most accurately reflects the nature of the interactions taking
189.

RUSSELL LANGLEY, PRACTICAL STATISTICS SIMPLY EXPLAINED 45 (Dover

Publ'n, 1971). Statistical mechanics does not concern itself with detailed consideration
of the actions of particular actors, but rather takes advantage of the fact that the actors

are numerous and average properties of a larger number of actors can be calculated even
in the absence of any information about specific actors. "Thus, an actuary for an
insurance company can predict with high precision the average life expectancy of all
persons born in the United States in a given year, without knowing the state of health of
any one of them."

FRANCIS W. SEARS & GERHARD L. SALINGER, THERMODYNAMICS,
KINETIC THEORY, AND STATISTICAL THERMODYNAMICS 302 (3d ed. 1975).

190.
191.
192.

EICHBERGER, supra note 168, at 1-2.
Id. at 2.
Id.

193.
194.

Id. at 34.
Id. at 2.

place between networked computers. Any cursory conclusion as to the
best form for the model without a detailed mathematical analysis adds
little to the discussion.
2. The Role of Reputation and Repetition
Beyond form, other factors play a role in structuring a game theory
model. Often, when interaction between players is repeated, a player is
willing to forego all gains in one game in order to receive higher gains in
subsequent games, if the overall gain is greater.1 95 For example, suppose
Player X wins in round 1 by lying, and the penalties for lying are
insufficient. If the relationship is repeated, then Player X may choose to
be honest in round 1 if total gains from round 1 and 2 together are
greater if Player X benefits from the reputation of being honest than
from lying in round 1.196 Game theory models that account for repetition
are called repetition form games. Reputation makes threats to punish
credible.
At first glance, a game theory model of cyberspace interactions may
seem like a repetition form game. However, reputation may not be
reliable in cyberspace if people can take on different personas and can
remain mostly anonymous. 197 In other words, since different users use
different computers, and may be identified as different players in
cyberspace, the player's past actions cannot accurately predict the
player's future action. Different users may be controlling the player (the
networked computer) at different times. Therefore, the game should not
be modeled as a repetition game unless anonymity on the Internet
effectively disappears.198 Instead, a one-shot game like the model
described above accurately represents reality: many users, using many
computers, potentially never using the same computer twice, but using
computers over and over again-many distinct, separate games are
played, rather than many repetitions taking place of the same single
game.

195. See id. at 205-30; RASMUSEN, supra note 158, at 121-40.
196. RASMUSEN, supra note 158, at 129.
197. See Rob Kling et al., Anonymous Communication Policies for the Internet:
Results and Recommendations of the AAAS Conference, INFORMATION SOCIETY 15
(1999), reprinted in CYBERETHICS: SOCIAL & MORAL ISSUES INTHE COMPUTER AGE 9798 (Robert M. Baird et al. eds., 2000) ( "[w]hile many people believe that anonymous
communication on the Internet is not only acceptable but has positive value, others see
risk in it because anonymous users are not accountable for their behavior.").
198. Many parties have interest in protecting or preventing anonymity on the
Internet. See Ku, supra note 2, at 38.
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IV. CONCLUSION

A game theory model of cyberspace has the potential to guide
international law makers in developing a regulatory framework which
not only maintains the ideals upon which the Internet was founded, but
also actualizes the international community's vision of an interconnected,
global democracy. Throughout history, humans have always struggled
with the threat of massive destruction caused by ideological differences
between peoples. In one century, humanity faced two world wars and a
nuclear arms race which threatened to destroy the entire world.
Humanity now sits at the cusp of a new era. The foundation for this era
has already been laid, with covenants, treaties, and declarations
committed to the sanctity of individuals and cultures.1 99 But the reality
is still far from the vision.
In the past, distance and access to information played a significant role
in differentiating peoples. With the expansion of the Internet, these
factors will play a smaller role in the future. Even as the world increasingly
specializes, separate disciplines must come together to integrate the
solutions. Lawmakers, business leaders, scholars, scientists and engineers
must all work together to find a solution for regulating this realm,
keeping in mind the vision of an interconnected and integrated global
community.
This solution must start first with a foundation. As the saying goes,
every solid house is built on a solid foundation. This is true even in
cyberspace. The architecture of the global Internet must provide the
fundamental framework for further international regulation. Game theory
tools developed in the field of mathematics and microeconomics should
be used to model this framework. The other constraints-law, social
norms, and market-should sit atop of this architecture foundation so
that together, all four constraints may interact in a manner that will
maintain the uniquely positive aspects of the Internet of information
dissemination while minimizing its less desirable effect of information
abuse.
VAN N. NGUY

199.

See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 19.
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